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Key messages
 • Stakeholders have different roles in the co-production of ecosystem services, e.g. they can be direct or indirect 
managers or beneficiaries. 
 • There are mismatches between those who manage and those who depend on or benefit from ecosystem services. 
 • Different forms of inequities are tied to these roles and can threaten the resilience of socio-ecological systems.  
 • Power asymmetries influence stakeholders’ roles in relation to ecosystem services, including their participation in 
ecosystem services governance.
 • Insights into roles, power and inequities can be useful for designing participatory governance mechanisms.
Ecosystems of living organisms and abiotic components 
produce ecosystem services through a complex web of 
relationships. But there are also ‘management ecosystems’, 
which are networks of stakeholders involved in the 
production and delivery of ecosystem services benefits 
through both competition and cooperation. As in any 
ecosystem, each entity affects and is affected by the others in 
a constantly evolving relationship. 
Different ecosystem services 
stakeholders and their roles: 
Exploring inequity
Healthy ecosystems such as forests, grasslands and estuaries 
help regulate storm water flows and drinking water supplies, 
support the pollination of crops, stabilize soil and provide 
timber, food and medicinal plants. Collectively, these benefits 
are known as ‘ecosystem services’ (ES).
Ecosystem services and social equity  
Who controls, who benefits and who loses?
Taking into account ES is important for public policy making 
because ecosystems contribute significantly to human well-
being. It is also essential to understand trade-offs among ES 
for landscape planning and management (Mastrángelo et 
al. 2019). A trade-off situation occurs if a gain in one quality, 
quantity or property implies a loss of other aspects. 
In simpler terms, for ES, it means that the increase of one 
service can happen at the cost (direct or indirect) of another 
service (Vallet et al. 2018). For example, in Peru, afforestation 
with exotic species such as pine or eucalyptus generates 
timber and income for rural dwellers, but decreases water 
resources (Bonnesoeur et al. 2019). This calls for integrated 
landscape management, taking into account multiple ES and 
their trade-offs. 
Sustainable development pathways with economic, 
environmental and societal outcomes are both desirable and 
attractive in theory, but in practice, these win–win narratives 
are difficult to achieve because of the existence of trade-offs 
(Vallet 2018). 
When decision-makers, planners and scientists do consider 
trade-offs, they usually focus on the biophysical dimensions 
of trade-offs, such as space (e.g. between upstream and 
downstream watershed communities) or provision of different 
ES (e.g. trade-offs between carbon sequestration and water 




What about the trade-offs between the well-being of different 
stakeholders related to ES? For example, what about those 
between people managing ecosystems and people benefiting 
from ES, including marginalized and excluded groups, or 
between men and women? These are seldom explored, and nor 
are the different roles that people hold in relation to managing, 
regulating and benefiting from ES (Mathez-Stiefel et al. 2017). 
Trade-offs between different ES, and between the well-being 
of different stakeholder groups, do not only occur because of 
the natural processes related to ES production. They also occur 
because of the human interventions needed for co-producing 
the benefits that we derive from ES (Lavorel et al. 2020). 
Co-production means that, in most cases, nature does not 
automatically serve us these benefits. We need to administer 
technology, knowledge, financial capital or other forms of direct 
and indirect management to ecosystems in order to reap them 
(Bruley et al. 2020). 
In this process, who controls, who manages and who benefits 
from ES? These are important questions to explore. The power 
to influence and manage ES is often poorly shared with the 
groups that depend on, or benefit from, ecosystems. Such 
inequities can create conflicts and threaten the resilience of 
both ecosystems and communities. 
A framework to analyze the role of 
stakeholders
We developed a straightforward analytical framework to explore 
these questions (Figure 1) and applied it to a case study in the 
Mariño watershed of Peru. Our framework builds on the idea 
of the ES cascade and can be applied to real-life situations in 
different contexts. The ES cascade is similar to a value chain: it 
illustrates the pathway that goes from ecological structures and 
processes at one end to the well-being of people at the other 
(Fedele et al. 2017).
We considered two types of interactions within the cascade: 
(1) management activities that contribute to the flow of ES 
and related benefits, and (2) benefits received by stakeholders. 
We further classified management activities into indirect and 
direct ones. Direct human interventions such as planting 
trees, building infrastructure and collecting products are only 
one facet of ES management, which can also be influenced 
indirectly by stakeholders controlling, sanctioning or 
incentivizing certain actions. In other words, direct managers 
affect the functioning of ecosystems and the services provided 
to society, while indirect managers facilitate and restrict the 
activities of direct managers or control the use of (and thus the 
benefits derived from) ES. 
Figure 1. Analytical framework with two forms of ecosystem services management (direct and indirect), which can 
occur at three steps of the ecosystem service cascade (ecosystem, service, use).
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Case study and methods
The Mariño watershed (Figure 2) stretches over 300 km2 along 
the eastern slopes of the Southern Peruvian Andes, in the 
region of Apurimac – one of the poorest regions in the country. 
Approximately 70,000 people live in the watershed, mostly in two 
urban areas, Abancay and Tamburco. Agriculture at high and mid 
elevations is subsistence oriented, whereas at low elevations both 
crop and livestock farming are commercially oriented and more 
intensive. There are also tourism activities in the Ampay Forest 
Sanctuary, which protects 3635 ha of land. Like other mountain 
social-ecological systems, the Mariño watershed provides 
important but vulnerable ES that contribute substantially to human 
well-being in the lowlands and highlands (Locatelli et al. 2017).
Figure 2. Map and pictures of the case study area. 
Photos and map: Améline Vallet
Figure 3. The eight ecosystem services prioritized by local stakeholders: two provisioning services (orange 
text), five regulating services (blue text) and one cultural service (purple text). 




We first organized several workshops with local stakeholders 
to identify the important ES and the key institutions and 
stakeholder groups in the area. Participants prioritized eight 
important ES (Figure 3). We then conducted semistructured 
interviews.  We asked the representatives of 52 different 
institutions and stakeholder groups questions concerning their 
ES activities, how they benefit from them and how they directly 
or indirectly manage them (if at all). We used this information  
to map and analyze the different stakeholder roles along  
the ES cascade.
We also asked the interviewees to identify with which actors 
they interacted in relation to the eight ES. We used this 
information to construct the social networks and to gain a 
better understanding of the power asymmetries.  We used 
tools commonly applied to SNA to compare stakeholder groups 
in the networks or to explain the formation of ties between 
stakeholders. The detailed methodology, the semistructured 
interview guide and the qualitative results for all eight ES can 
be found in the related open-access journal articles (Vallet et al. 
2019, 2020).  
Mismatches between those who 
benefit and those who manage
We found that the groups that depended on or benefited from 
ES were not necessarily involved in their management. For 
example, beneficiaries of global climate regulation were rural 
and urban populations, local businesses (fish farms, tourism, 
agribusinesses) as well as several public institutions. However, 
those active in mitigating climate change were mainly 
the NGOs and public environmental institutions (through 
afforestation, reforestation and emission reduction programs). 
Direct managers were mostly local stakeholders, businesses and 
civil society, whereas indirect managers were often national-
level organizations and other public sector groups (facilitating 
or restricting direct management and use). For example, direct 
managers of medicinal plants were rural dwellers who harvested, 
transported and sold medicinal plants in the city markets, or who 
cultivated plant species in their fields. On the other hand, indirect 
managers were the public institutions in charge of controlling 
and sanctioning activities related to wild flora or protected areas. 
For most ES, groups involved in direct ES management were 
likely to be beneficiaries as well. For example, farmers who directly 
managed agricultural production and thus co-produced these 
ES benefited from the agricultural products through trade and 
income generation.
Stakeholders involved in the first step of the cascade, i.e. the 
ecosystem level, had the most control over the benefits 
received at the last step, i.e. the benefit level. For example, 
farmers managing agricultural production by planting and 
cultivating crops (ecosystem and service levels) influenced 
the quantity of food available to consumers. But this influence 
only related to the quantity or quality of the ES, and not to 
the distribution aspects (i.e. who could receive these benefits). 
Similarly, farmers and communities were powerful in influencing 
land management and the water supply (e.g. through 
reforesting and protecting wetlands), but were powerless in 
deciding the allocation of water use among various users. On 
the contrary, the National Water Authority (ANA) was powerless 
in terms of land management, but powerful in controlling and 
authorizing water consumption. 
Water ES were particularly tied to such equity and justice issues. 
In the Mariño watershed, water is predominantly channeled 
downstream to urban areas by EMUSAP, the local drinking water 
service provider licensed by ANA. In the river downstream from the 
Rontococcha dam (eastern part of the watershed), water extraction 
for the city resulted in water scarcity for other uses, for example, 
agriculture. This led to conflicts between upland and lowland 
farming communities around access to water. Downstream farmers 
were also troubled by water quality issues, as the little water that 
reached their fields was contaminated by the city. 
These insights can serve as the basis for discussing more 
equitable ES management in a particular area. For example, 
they can be used in the discussions related to the proposed 
payment scheme for water ES in the watershed. The scheme 
can potentially offer opportunities for collective action, direct 
participation and coordination between diverse stakeholders. 
The different roles that stakeholders play in the ES cascade, 
and the associated inequities and power asymmetries can be 
explained by stakeholders’ differentiated rights and entitlements, 
access to resources and other capital, and constraints tied to 
location, institutions and social norms. Power asymmetries can 
also be explained by the formal or informal relationships  
among stakeholders. 
Social network analysis to highlight 
power asymmetries and related 
conflicts
We conducted a social network analysis (SNA) to gain further 
insight into the power relationships among ES managers 
and beneficiaries. The main objectives of SNA are to map 
and measure the relationships (relational ties) that connect 
individuals or organizations (actors) into a network, and to 
identify key and isolated actors or groups (Di Gregorio et al. 
2019). It examines and explains power based on actor positions 
in a particular network. For example, actors who are at the 




Table 1. Two types of power asymmetries considered in the study and their impact on ES governance.
Asymmetry within one form of power Asymmetry between different 
forms of powerInfluence Domination
Graphical 
representation
Definition Some actors are more influential 
than others (here, A)
Some actors are more dominant 
than others (here, C)
The most influential actors (A) are 
not the most dominant (C) and 
vice versa
Positive 
impacts on ES 
governance
• Efficient coordination (if C is 
doing its job) (Bodin 2017; 
Guerrero et al. 2020)
• Contribution to sustainability 
(if C pushes for sustainability 
actions) (Fischer 2014)
• Efficient information sharing (if 
A is doing its job) (Bodin 2017; 
Guerrero et al. 2020)
• Contribution to sustainability 
(if A shares information that 
helps sustainability actions) 
(Fischer 2014)
• Limited risk of abuse by 
an authoritarian actor 
concentrating influence 
and domination powers, 
existence of countervailing 
power (e.g. A’s abuses can be 
denounced by C, acting as a 
whistle blower) (Fung et al. 
2003; Crona and Bodin 2010)
• Efficiency from distributed 
responsibilities and 
specialization (e.g. A is 
specialized in information 
sharing)
• Multiple catalysts for change 
(A can stimulate change and 
challenge inertia of C or vice 
versa) (Crona and Bodin 2010)
Negative 
impacts on ES 
governance
• Power concentration without 
countervailing power, which 
can lead to manipulation 
(powerful actor A can filter or 
distort information) or blockage 
(powerful actor A can block or 
restrain information sharing) 
(Crona and Bodin 2010; Barnes 
et al., 2016)
• Lack of information diversity 
(which can limit collective 
learning)
• Power concentration without 
countervailing power, which 
can lead to inertia (powerful 
actor C can voluntarily restrict 
actions or be inefficient) or 
abuse of authority (C can act 
for its own benefit) (Bodin 
2017; Guerrero et al. 2020)
• Lack of diversity in leadership 
(which can limit innovation)
• Risk of disguised centralized 
power if A and C are allies 
(e.g. if C is an authoritarian 
government and A is its press 
agency)
• Risk of blockage or conflicts 
from power contests if A and 
C disagree (and A campaigns 










(i.e. with high centrality measures) are better positioned to 
influence others. There are different centrality measures that 
can be used to illustrate such power. Here we focus on degree 
centrality, which shows the number of relational ties held by an 
actor, telling us how many direct ‘one-hop’ connections this actor 
has to others in the network. 
Following previous studies conducted by sociologists, we 
looked into two forms of relational power within our SNA: 
domination and influence. Domination is the capacity to offer or 
withhold benefit or harms through force, coercion or authority. 
Influence consists of providing information in order to change 
an actor’s opinion, attitude or behavior. Power asymmetries 
correspond to the uneven distribution of these two dimensions 
of power among actors (Table 1).
In addition to identifying power asymmetries, we also aimed at 
understanding the different types of power handled by actors. We 
used a framework proposed by Knoke (1990), which distinguishes 
between four types of actors based on their levels of influence and 
domination (Figure 4): actors with coercive, authoritative, persuasive 
and egalitarian (i.e. weak) power. We were also specifically interested 
in who exerted power over whom in relation to ES governance and 












































Figure 5. The eight types of relationships (text in small 
circles) representing influence, domination and cooperation 
(the diameters of the circles are not informative).
To build the SNA, we asked our interviewees who they 
interacted with according to eight types of relationships 
representing influence, domination and cooperation (Figure 5). 
At the end of the interview process, we also asked interviewees 
to indicate with which actors they had had troubled or tense 
relationships and to explain why. 
We combined the influence relationships to form an influence 
network (1+2) and proceeded in a similar manner for the 
domination (3+4) and cooperation (5+6+7+8) networks (Figure 6). 
We considered domination to be a directional network (i.e. one 
actor is identified as the initiator of the relationship and the other as 
the receiver), but influence and cooperation to be nondirectional 
ones (i.e. both actors participate in the relationship equally).  
Considering power, we found that the two networks of influence 
and domination were poorly correlated, suggesting that influential 
actors are not necessarily dominant ones. The two networks also 
differed in terms of their core/periphery structure (Figure 7). In 
general, the dense and cohesive core of a network encompasses 
the central actors that have a disproportionate number of relational 
ties, whereas actors in the sparsely connected periphery maintain 
few relational ties. 
The core–periphery structures correspond to the power 
distribution among the different stakeholder types. Actors from 
the business sector showed significantly lower centrality scores in 
the influence network, while actors from the public sector showed 
significantly higher centrality scores in the domination network. 
The type of power handled by actors also depended on their role. 
ES beneficiaries were more likely to be found in the weak actor 
Figure 4. Actors exhibit four types of power depending 
on the extent of their influence and domination 














Figure 6. Influence (straight light gray ties) and domination 
(curved dark gray ties) networks. The thickness of the ties is 













group. On the contrary, direct managers were more likely to 
be persuasive, and indirect managers to have authoritative 
or coercive power. Similarly, actors from the public sector 
were more likely to form influence relationships while the 
opposite was true of business actors. Business and civil society 
actors were more likely to be the receivers of a domination 
relationship, most frequently initiated by public sector actors. 
The existence of a cooperation relationship also positively 
affected the formation of both influence and domination 
ties, i.e. two actors who cooperated were more likely to 
influence or dominate each other. The most central actors in 
the cooperation network were the most likely initiators of the 
domination relationships. 
Our statistical analyses within the SNA showed that the 
existence of a domination relationship between two actors 
strongly increased the probability of conflict occurrence. Big 
differences in the domination centrality scores between two 
actors increased this probability even further, meaning that 
conflicts were more likely when really powerful and really 
powerless actors were involved. Conversely, conflicts were less 
likely between actors of the same sector. 
Concluding remarks: Power, inequity 
and ecosystem governance
Our results demonstrate that power asymmetries are associated 
with conflicts, which in turn can influence the resilience of 
socio-ecological systems, in our case the resilience of the 
Mariño watershed. Power asymmetries can also cause mistrust 
in the institutions responsible for different aspects of  
ES governance. 
Power and related inequities can have different aspects. They 
can arise due to the different roles that stakeholders hold in 
relation to ES, the different rights, resources and locations 
of stakeholders, and the relationships that they form. These 
aspects are also interrelated; they influence each other and can 
be explored using our ES cascade framework, SNA and  
other methods. 
The ES cascade framework highlights the different roles of 
stakeholders in the management of ecosystems and ES, and in 
the use of their benefits. It can also illustrate the inequities that 
are tied to these roles. Power asymmetries can then be explored 
further with SNA. 
Understanding the social networks of ES governance can help 
us to make sense of both the enabling conditions and the 
obstacles to sustainable and equitable ecosystem management. 
Identifying key players, isolated actors and those who can foster 
new collaborations or relationships between groups can be 
useful for land use planning, conflict resolution and the design 
of participatory governance mechanisms. 
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